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California: A Privacy Statute Meets the GLBA & FCRA

I. INTRODUCTION

One-stop financial shopping and financial privacy-these are
two catch phrases that are not complimentary. Both provide different
benefits.
One-stop financial shopping provides convenience to
consumers and allows financial institutions to operate more efficiently. 1
One-stop financial shopping is also a powerful marketing tool for
financial institutions, as they may be more likely to sell different
services to one consumer.2 Conversely, financial privacy statutes may
restrict the sharing of consumer information among affiliates and among
non-affiliates.3 These catch phrases collided in the case of American
Bankers Association v. Lockyer.4
In Lockyer, the Eastern District Court of California was asked to
rule upon a California privacy statute (SB 1) applicable to financial
institutions.5 SB l's principal purpose is to restrict financial institutions'
use of a consumer's "nonpublic personal information. 6 SB 1 deals with
the sharing of nonpublic information by affiliates of financial
institutions, as well as by unaffiliated third parties with which these
institutions may choose to do business.7 SB 1 prevents a financial
institution from sharing nonpublic personal consumer information with

1. L. Richard Fischer & Oliver I. Ireland, FederalCourt Made Mistake in Calif.DataSharing Case, AM. BANKER, Aug. 20, 2004, at 11 (stating that cross-marketing and sharing
of consumer information provides benefits that could not be achieved without such use of
information).
2. Id.
3. See generally CAL. FIN. CODE § 4051 (2004) (noting that California's restrictions on
certain information sharing are broader than corresponding federal information sharing
regulations).
4. Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Lockyer, No. CIV.S 04-0778 MCE KJ, 2004 WL 1490432
* 1 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2004) (holding that the California privacy statute would apply and
thus prevent nationally charted banks from sharing certain consumer information among
their affiliates).
5. See id. at * 1.
6. Barry A. Abbott & Clayton T. Coon, Financial Privacy and the California
Experience, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 411,415 (2004).
7. See id.
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unaffiliated third parties unless consent to do so is obtained via an "opt
in" provision in the financial institution's privacy policy. 8 In dealing
with information sharing among affiliates, SB1 prohibits a financial
institution from sharing personal consumer information with an affiliate
unless a consumer is given an opportunity to "opt out" of such sharing
annually. 9 In passing SB1, the California legislature wanted to give
state consumers more protection than was offered in the Gramm-LeachBliley Act of 1999 (GLBA).' 0 The trial court concluded that SB1 was
not preempted and thus applied to nationally charted banks within the
state of California.1"
Lockyer thus eliminated benefits Congress
intended for nationally chartered financial institutions and opened the
door to different or inconsistent regulations for nationally chartered
12
banks in individual states.
Part II of this Note will discuss the background and history of
preemption, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency's (OCC) role in interpreting the GLBA and FCRA. 13 Part III
will discuss in detail the facts and holding in Lockyer, and look at why
the court's analysis of the preemption issue presented in the case was
inconsistent with existing preemption law. 1 4 Part IV will discuss the
potential practical impact of the Lockyer decision.1 5 Part V will discuss
16
the current status of the Lockyer case.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

& HISTORY OF PREEMPTION, GLBA, FCRA & OCC

Preemption in General

The Supremacy Clause states that "this Constitution and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof
8. Id. at 417.
9. Id. at 420.
10. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 4051 (2004).

11. See generally Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Lockyer, No. CIV.S 04-0778 MCE KJ, 2004
WL 1490432 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2004) (holding that SBI applies to state financial
institutions as well).
12. See infra notes 125-49 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 17-68 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 69-24 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 125-49 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
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shall be the supreme Law of the Land."' 7 An effect of this provision is
to invalidate state laws which "interfere with or are contrary to federal
law."' 8 In addition, any state legislation which hinders the effectiveness
of a federal law will be deemed invalid as contrary to the rule
announced in the Supremacy Clause.' 9
There are three ways the United States Supreme Court has
recognized in which a federal law can preempt a state law: express
Express
preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption. 20
preemption occurs when Congress explicitly intends to preempt state
law in a certain field and states its intent in "an explicit statutory
command that state law be displaced.",2 ' Field preemption occurs when
a federal regulation is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference

that Congress left no room for the States to supplement

it.,

22

Lastly,

conflict preemption arises when it is impossible to comply with both the
federal law and state law.23 Conflict preemption can arise in a number
of different situations, such as when compliance with both the federal
and state law is impossible, when compliance with either the federal or
state law means a violation of the other, or when compliance with the
state law would frustrate the purposes of the federal law.24 Additionally
conflict preemption occurs when the state law "impairs the efficiencies
of [the] agencies of the Federal government to discharge the duties for
25
the performance of which they were created.,
In light of the three types of preemption, when a preemption
issue arises, a court will apply an assumption against preemption of the
state regulation.26 However, because there "is a history of significant
17. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
18. In re Roger Allen, 255 B.R. 25, 31 (2000).

19. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971).
20. St. Thomas-St. John Hotel & Tourism Ass'n Inc. v. United States, 218 F.3d 232,
238 (3rd Cir. 2000).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (holding, in a

case not related to banking law, that Congress' legislative action left no room for states to
act in the area regulated by the federal government).
23. St. Thomas-St. John Hotel, 218 F.3d at 238.
2003:
MODERNIZATION
SERVICES
GLANz,
FINANCIAL
R.
24. See
ROBERT
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT, Am. Law Inst., 82 (2003).
25. McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 357 (1896) (holding that there was no
conflict between the special powers the Congress created for national banks and laws of
Massachusetts).
26. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
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federal presence' ' 27 in the banking industry, the assumption against
preemption of state regulation generally is not valid.28 In attempting to
determine congressional intent, the court will give a plain meaning
construction of both statutes.2 9 In interpreting federal statutes in a
preemption analysis, courts use traditional methods of statutory
construction, such as a plain meaning analysis.3 ° Courts may also apply
what is known as the Chevron analysis if they seek to interpret federal
statutes by reference to construction of those statutes by the federal
agencies designated to administer those statutes.31 Under this analysis,
courts will give "considerable weight to an executive department's
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer' ' 32 and
will generally defer to agency interpretations if they are reasonable.33
B.

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA)

The purpose of the GLBA was financial modernization; GLBA
specifically allows financial holding companies to do certain things they
historically could not do.34 Also included in the GLBA, though, are
provisions which required financial holding companies to respect the
personal information of their clients when it is shared with both
affiliates and unaffiliated third parties. 35 The GLBA provides certain
restrictions on the use of a consumer's "nonpublic private information"
by financial holding companies and requires banks to provide notice of
such use to consumers.3 6 When "nonpublic private information" is
going to be shared with an unaffiliated third party, consumers must
receive a notice informing them of their right to opt out of the financial
holding company's sharing program.37 However, there are fewer
27. See Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass'n, No. 04-1948-CV, 2005 WL 119867, at

*3.
28. See id.

29. See Locke, 529 U.S. at 108.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See generally id.
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
Id. at 844.
Id. at 845.
See David W. Roderer, Tentative Steps Toward FinancialPrivacy, 4 N.C. BANKING

209 (2000).
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2000).
36. See Abbott & Coon, supra note 6, at 421.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(1) (2000).

INST.
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restrictions placed on financial holding companies when the customer's
personal information is shared with one of the holding company's
affiliates.38 Under the GLBA, when a financial holding company shares
"nonpublic personal information" with one of its affiliates, the only
39
of the sharing policy.
requirement is that the consumer be informed
However, the GLBA does require financial institutions, at least
annually, to provide clear and conspicuous disclosures to their
consumers of policies concerning the sharing of consumer information
40
with both affiliates and unaffiliated third parties.
Of primary importance in Lockyer is the preemption clause of
the GLBA which expressly provides for "greater protection under State
law [since a] State statute, regulation, order, or interpretation is not
inconsistent with the provisions of [the GLBA] if the protection such
statute, regulation, order, or interpretation affords any person is greater
4
that the protection provided under [the GLBA].,, ' This clause, which
Congress inserted into the GLBA, allows for states to enact more
42
restrictive state privacy laws than the GLBA and was the justification
SB 1.43
used by the California legislature in passing
C.

FairCredit Reporting Act (FCRA) & Fairand Accurate Credit
TransactionsAct (FACT)

The FCRA is important in a privacy setting because it places
constraints on how companies can share personal consumer
If the information involved is part of a consumer
information."
45 then a consumer must first be given notice and the chance to
report,
opt out of the sharing.4 6
The purpose of the FCRA is "to require that consumer reporting
agencies adopt reasonable procedures for personal, insurance, and other
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 6803(a) (2000).
39. Id.
40. See id.

41. 15 U.S.C. § 6807(b) (2000).
42. See Abbott & Coon, supra note 6, at 422.
43. See generally CAL. FIN. CODE § 4051 (2004) (noting that the legislature relied upon

the GLBA anit-preemption clause).
44. See Abbott & Coon, supra note 6, at 412.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 a(d)(1) (2000) (noting that a consumer report is "any written, oral,
or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency).
46. Id.

228
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information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer,
with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy and proper
utilization of such information. 47 As a result, the FCRA created
standards for collecting and disseminating consumer information,
including rules about credit reports. 48 The rules were created to cover a
broad scope of activity dealing with customer information, including
aspects of a customer's financial background.4 9 One important FCRA
provision allows affiliates to share consumer report information as long
as customers receive notice of such sharing and are given the
opportunity to opt out of the sharing policy. 50 Affiliates can share
consumer information because of the definition of "consumer reports"
and the information which may be contained in a "consumer report" as
defined by the FCRA. 5 These definitions are important because in
Lockyer the trial court read the term "consumer reports" into the
applicable FCRA and FACT Act provisions.52 The FCRA states that a
consumer report is "any written, oral, or other communication of any
information by a consumer reporting agency., 53 A consumer reporting
agency is defined as "any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on
cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the
practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or
other information on consumers. 5 4 The OCC has further interpreted a
consumer reporting agency as "any person that regularly collects and
communicates this information to third parties. 55 Important to note is
that the FCRA excludes from the definition of a consumer report
"communication of information among persons related by
common
47.

15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2004).

48. See Brief for OTS, OCC, FDIC, FRB, NCUA and FITC at 3, Am. Bankers Ass'n v.

Lockyer, No. CIV.S 04-0778 MCE KJ, 2004 WL 1490432 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2004)

[hereinafter Agency Brief].
49. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (2000); Agency Brief, supra note 48, at 3
(discussing several statutory definitions that result in broad regulatory activity).

50. See
information
51. See
information

15 U.S.C. § 1681s-3 (2000) (allowing for affiliate sharing of consumer
for marketing purposes).
15 U.S.C. § 1681a (2000) (defining the term consumer report and the
in consumer report in a general manner).

52. See Lockyer, 2004 WL 1490432 *1 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2004) (relying on the notion

that consumer reports are an important distinguishing factor between the FCRA, GLBA and
SB 1).

53. 15 U.S.C. § 168 1a(d)(l) (2000).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 168 1a(f) (2000).
55. See Agency Brief, supra note 48, at 3.
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56 FCRA allows for
ownership or affiliated by corporate control.
"communication of other information among persons related by
57 As a result the
common ownership or affiliated by corporate control.
FCRA creates a situation which allows financial institutions to share
customer information with affiliates, so it would seem that express
preemption would apply to SB 1.58
Lastly, there is a preemption clause in the FCRA, which
provides that "no requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the
laws of any State with respect to the exchange of information among
persons affiliated by common ownership or common corporate
control. 5 9 There is an interaction between this FCRA preemption
clause and the preemption clause contained in the GLBA, which was
discussed earlier.6' The GLBA preemption clause does not affect or
alter the preemption clause found in the FCRA, as a result the FCRA
preemption clause can apply in a situation where the GLBA does not
apply. The FCRA preemption clause was set to expire on January 1,
2004, but the adoption by Congress of the FACT Act deleted the sunset
provision in the FCRA's preemption clause; as a result, the FCRA's
preemption clause will continue to apply unless Congress takes action
to restrict its future application.61
In addition to extending the applicability of the FCRA's
preemption clause, the FACT Act contained many other amendments to
FCRA.6 2 The FACT Act prohibits the sharing of information for
marketing purposes unless it is both clearly and obviously disclosed to
the customer that their information can be shared with others for the
purposes of soliciting the customer; and the customer must be given an
63
opportunity and manner to prevent the solicitations by such persons.
This FACT provision is important in the privacy setting because
financial holding companies have been known to share consumer

56. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(ii) (2000) (sharing of information among affiliates is
not completely restricted).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(iii).
58. See Agency Brief, supra note 48, at 4.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(2) (2000).
60. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
61. See Abbott & Coon, supra note 6, at 425.
62. Id. (noting that some of the amendments included a program to deal with identity
theft, a program that entitled consumers to get their credit report for free, and an extension
of the statute of limitations for FCRA violations).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 168ls-3(a)(l)(A)&(B) (2000).

230
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information between both affiliates and unaffiliated third parties for
marketing purposes. 64
D.

Office of the Comptrollerof the Currency (OCC) & Other
Regulatory Agencies

One purpose of the OCC is to provide a system of national
banks in which there is stability and confidence.65
The OCC
administers the GLBA, FCRA and FACT Act.66 Recently the OCC
supported preemption arguments for nationally chartered banks in
opinion letters. 67 This could be important upon appeal when the court
considers if SB 1 is preempted or not. The OCC has also issued a
regulation under which the OCC can issue rules which preempt state
law in order for the OCC to effectuate its purpose and duties for
nationally chartered banks; 68 however, a court has not yet ruled on this
regulation.
III. THE
A.

LOCKYER CASE

The Fact & Holdings of Lockyer

A primary issue in Lockyer was whether the California Financial
Information Privacy Act (SB 1) could require certain financial institution
disclosures regarding privacy policies and that customers be given
optional participation rights with regard to those information sharing
policies .69

SB 1 requires that consumers be given control over certain
financial information by requiring an opt-out provision for the sharing
of information with affiliate institutions and requiring opt-in provisions
to share information with non-affiliated institutions.7 ° In enacting SB 1,
64. Fischer & Ireland, supra note 1, at 11.

65. See generally Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals,
69 Fed. Reg. 1904-18 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 7 C.F.R. parts 7 & 34) (noting that that a
function of the OCC is to regulate national bank operations).
66. Agency Brief, supra note 48, at 12.

67. E. EDWARD
Law Inst. (2004).

BRUCE ET AL., NATIONAL BANK PREEMPTION LITIGATION,

68. 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 & 34 (2004).
69. Lockyer, 2004 WL 1490432, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2004).
70. Id.

Practicing
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the California state legislature was worried that the GLBA did not
provide sufficient protection for the use of the financial information of
Californians," so SB 1 created more privacy protection for Californians
than was granted under federal legislation.7 2
The American Bankers Association (ABA) sought to invalidate
SB 1 by asserting that it was expressly preempted by the FCRA and as a
result, that SB1 violated the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution.7 3 Thus, the ABA argues, FCRA's preemption clause gave
states no ability to enact law regulating the sharing of information
between banks and their affiliates or unaffiliated third parties.
74
The trial court in Lockyer granted summary judgment on
behalf of Lockyer because the ABA failed to show that the SB 1 was
expressly preempted,7 5 or that preemption could be inferred because
federal regulation in the area of financial institutions sharing of
customer information was so pervasive.76 The court concluded, giving a
narrow reading of statutory construction, that the preemption clause in
FCRA was not applicable to SB 1.77 As a result, SB 1 was not preempted
and thus applied to financial institutions within the state.78 The court, in
reaching this conclusion, held that the GLBA permitted for laws like
SB1 to be passed by states 79 and that the GLBA expressly authorized
8°
states to pass more restrictive laws on such sharing of information.
Analysis of the Decision in Lockyer

B.

Faced with the issue of preemption, the first thing the Lockyer
71.

Id.

72. Id at *2.
73. Id.

74. Lockyer, 2004 WL 1490432, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2004) (noting that the case
must be decided in summary judgment because the issue involved was purely a matter of
law).
75. Id. at *6.
76. Id. at *5.
77. Id. at *4 (noting that the court used cannons of statutory construction to determine
that the FCRA was not applicable).
78. See generally id. at *6 (noting that summary judgment was granted against the ABA
and that SB 1 was valid).

79. Id.
80. See generally id. (assuming that the state regulation is not inconsistent with GLBA
or another federal statute, then it will not be preempted; if it is inconsistent, then the state
regulation will be preempted.)
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court did was to apply a presumption against state preemption basing its
decision on the notion that consumer protection legislation falls within a
state's historic police powers. 8' As a result, the court concluded that
there was "a heightened presumption against preemption [of
California's state law]. 82 Thus, the court gave a narrow reading of the
FCRA.8 3 The result of this narrow reading of the statute was to further
enhance the probability that the SB I would not be preempted.84
The court then attempted to determine the congressional intent
of the federal statutes (GLBA, FCRA and FACT Act) at issue by
applying a narrow reading of the statutes. 85 The narrow reading of the
GLBA, FCRA and FACT Act allowed the court to conclude that SB1
was not expressly preempted, SB 1 was not preempted by any federal
law that covers the field, application of SB1 would not defeat the
purpose of the federal laws, and compliance with one does not preclude
compliance with the other.86
The court did not plainly construe the FCRA provision which
states that "[n]o requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the
laws of any State with respect to the exchange of information among
persons affiliated by common ownership or common corporate
control, 87 which by its plain language specifically preempts any state
law which attempts to impose regulations upon affiliates sharing
information.8 8 Instead, the court read this provision in a manner which
allowed it to conclude that California's restrictions on affiliate sharing
of information were authorized by federal law. The court also looked at
the FCRA and FACT Act generally and concluded that the FCRA and
FACT Act only apply when the information shared is in "consumer
reports., 89 However, the term "consumer reports" is absent from the
81. Id. at *3.
82. Id. (reaching this conclusion, the court mentioned that because SB I related to an
area of consumer protection, the states historical police power covers this area so a
presumption against state preemption applies).
83. See id. at *4 (analyzing the statute based on a narrow reading).
84. See generally Lockyer, 2004 WL 1490432, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2004) (noting

that the statute must be read narrowly and against finding preemption; this increased the
likelihood that the trial court would conclude SB I was valid).
85. See id. at *5.
86. See supra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.

87. 15 U.S.C. § 168 It(b)(2) (2000).
88. See Agency Brief, supra note 48, at 16.
89. See generally Lockyer, 2004 WL 1490432 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2004) (relying on the
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relevant parts of the FCRA and FACT Act, 90 furthermore the term
"consumer reports" does not appear in the FCRA preemption provision;
as a result one would expect that the preemption provision would not be
limited only to "consumer report" information. However, the trial court
asserted that because the California statute deals with the sharing of
information not in "consumer reports" the FCRA and FACT Acts are
not applicable and could not create preemption. 9' While ultimately the
court attempts to circumvent any problem with its conclusion by noting
that the FCRA only applies to "consumer reports, ' ' 92 it is interesting to
note that no such "consumer reports" term is found in FCRA
preemption provision.9 3 This is because the preemption provision was
not meant to be limited to just information contained in consumer
reports.

94

The court's reading of the preemption provision to include the
term "consumer reports" allowed the court to find that SB1 was not
preempted; 95 it was the conclusion that SB 1 was not being preempted
conclusion which was controversial. In other preemption provisions
when Congress deemed necessary, it specifically included the terms
''consumer reporting agency" and "consumer reports" in such
provisions.9 6 In the Lockyer case, the court implied that Congress
accidentally omitted or implied the terms "consumer reporting agency"
and consumer reports," and as a result there was a need to read such into
the statute. 97 So the terms were read into the FCRA and FACT Act
seemingly in direct contradiction of Congress' previous actions to
98
include the terms when only when it thought doing so was necessary.
notion that consumer reports are an important distinguishing feature).
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(2) (2000) (noting that the preemption is not limited to the
type of information shared only in consumer reports); see generally Lockyer, 2004 WL
1490432 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2004) (noting that if the legislature had intended the statute to
apply to only "consumer report" information, Congress would have imposed such a
restriction, and because it did not, such a restriction should not be included).
91. See generally Lockyer, 2004 WL 1490432 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2004).
92. See id.
93. See supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
94. See U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(2) (2000) (noting that the preemption clause is not just
limited to consumer reports).
95. See generally Agency Brief, supra note 48, at 17.
96. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(l) (2004) (excluding and including the term
consumer reports into the statute when it was necessary).
97. See Lockyer, 2004 WL 1490432 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2000).
98. See id.
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The courts also relied upon the GLBA's anti-preemption clause
in reaching its decision. 99 The court concluded that the GLBA antipreemption clause can prevent a state law from being preempted by the
FCRA preemption clause. 00 The trial court concluded this despite the
provision in the GLBA which directly states that the anti-preemption
clause does not cover the FCRA. 0' Also, the GLBA privacy section
provides "that nothing in this title [the GLBA] shall be construed to
modify, limit, or supersede the operation of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act." 2 As a result of this provision, the GLBA cannot be read to alter
or supercede any provision in the FCRA,10 3 including the preemption
provision.
C.

A Possible Different Result in Lockyer

°4
In light of the above discussions about preemption generally,'
the relevant statutes 0 5 and the facts of Lockyer, 10 6 one would expect that
the court in Lockyer would have concluded that SB1 should be
preempted.107
One would have expected the court's analysis in Lockyer to
have been different. Initially addressing the issue of presumptions in a
preemption case one would have anticipated that the Locke case'0°
would have controlled this issue. Locke states that in the field of
banking law, because there is such a great historical federal presence,
the general presumption against state preemption does not apply.10 9 As
a result, one would have expected that the Lockyer court would not have
applied a presumption against preemption of SB 1, as the court in fact

99. See generally id (relying on the GLBA anti-preemption clause as a basis for its
decision).
100. See Agency Brief, supra note 48, at 21.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 6806 (2000).
102. Id.
103. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 6806 (2000) (interpreting the section by its plain

language).
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See supra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 34-64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
See Abbott & Coon, supra note 6, at 411.
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
Id.
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did in the case.11°
Even assuming that the court incorrectly applied a presumption
against preemption of SB 1, one would have expected the court, in its
attempt to determine congressional intent with respect to the federal
statutes at issue, would give plain meaning to the relevant statutes." 1 If
the Lockyer court would have given SB 1, the GLBA, and the FCRA a
plain construction according to their terms, all three statutes in some
way should have been expected to render SB 1 preempted.
The GLBA requirements of disclosure are not as strict as those
mandated by SB 1.11 2 Specifically, SB1 prevents a financial institution
from sharing nonpublic personal consumer information with unaffiliated
third parties unless consent to do so is obtained via an "opt in"provision
in the financial institution's privacy policy." 3 SB 1 prohibits a financial
institution from sharing personal consumer information with an affiliate
unless a consumer is given an opportunity to "opt out" of such sharing
annually. 114 However, the GLBA does require financial institutions to
disclose to customers its policy on sharing nonpublic personal
information with affiliates."'
The GLBA preemption provision
provides that the GLBA "shall not be construed as superseding, altering,
or affecting any statute, regulation, order, or interpretation in effect in
any State."' 1 6 A plain meaning interpretation could result in this being
read as meaning to preempt laws that came into affect after the passage
of the GLBA and to not preempt laws that were preexisting at the
time." 7 If such a reading were given to the GLBA preemption
provision, it would preempt the California legislature from enacting
SB1. Also, the GLBA anti-preemption clause does not mention the
FCRA. 1 8 As a result, the GLBA anti-preemption clause cannot be used
as a justification for states to enact stricter laws in conflict with the
110. See Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Lockyer, No. CIV.S 04-0778 MCE KJ, 2004 WL
1490432 *1 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2004).
111. See supra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.

112. See Abbott & Coon, supra note 6, at 411; see also supra notes 34-43, 69-80 and
accompanying text.
113. See Abbott & Coon, supra note 6, at 411.
114. Id.
115. See id.

116. 15 U.S.C. § 6807(a) (2000).
117. Id.

118. See 15 U.S.C. § 6807(b) (2000) (noting that the statute omits any mention of
FCRA).
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FCRA provisions. So if a court finds that the FCRA provisions are
implicated, then the FCRA preemption provision governs.
At the very least one would anticipate that because of the FCRA
preemption provision, the portion of SB1 which deals with the
restriction on the sharing of nonpublic personal information with
affiliates would be preempted. That is because the FCRA preemption
provision provides that no state law may be imposed to limit the
exchange of information among affiliates. 119 Also, the plain meaning of
the FCRA preemption provision does not allow for states to act in the
area of financial institutions sharing information with affiliates, and this
is not limited to information in consumer reports. As a result it would
seem that SB 1, which attempts to regulate sharing of information with
affiliates, should be preempted by the FCRA, if a plain meaning
interpretation is given to the preemption provision and SB 1.120
One would also expect the court to undertake what is known as
the Chevron analysis-giving weight to the executive department's
construction of the GLBA, FCRA and FACT Act. 12 ' Based upon the six
agency 122 amicus brief submitted 12 3 and opinion letters which supported
the preemption argument, one would have anticipated the court to give
deference to the agencies charged with implementing the statutes, and to
find that SB 1 was indeed preempted. However, as discussed above, this
24
was not the result that the court actually reached in Lockyer.1
IV. IMPACT OF LOCKYER

A.

Consumer and State Benefits

The result of the Lockyer case for consumers in California is
that they now have greater control over their financial information
under certain circumstances, if the case is upheld upon appeal. 12 In
California, consumers can opt out of sharing their information with
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(2) (2000).
120. See Abbott & Coon, supra note 6, at 411.

121. See supra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
125. See generally Federal Court Rules California Privacy Statutes Take Precedence
Over FACTAct, 28 EFT REP., July 7, 2004, at 2004 WL 62675944.
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affiliates and can refuse their SB1-required consent to the sharing of
126
information shared with unaffiliated third parties.
States also gain an aspect of control, as they can now potentially
regulate certain areas to protect their citizens' financial information
without fear of preemption by the GLBA or FCRA. 127 Statutes, like
SBI, which are passed by states, will apply to nationally chartered
banks and will apply to out-of-state chartered banks to the extent that
such banks do business in states with statutes like SB 1. The Lockyer
decision also reaffirms that states can continue to act in the consumer
protection area, as they have historically, without the worry of
preemption, 128 so long as the state statute does not clearly conflict with a
textual provision of a federal statute.
The main benefit to individual consumers and states as a result
29
of Lockyer is more control over the sharing of financial information.
While this may be positive, the impact on the banking industry is
anything but positive.
B.

Impact on the Banking Industry

The immediate impact of Lockyer was surprise, because most
financial holding companies were not expecting to have to comply with
the new California statute. 30 It is the financial industry's ability to
cross market which is most directly impacted by the decision. 1 ' Cross
marketing enables large financial holding companies and banks with
operating financial subsidiaries to use their customer bases to provide
"one-stop shops" for their customers' financial needs. 3 2
Cross
marketing also allows these institutions to sell consumer information to
unaffiliated third parties. This cross marketing benefit was recognized
by Congress when it passed the GLBA and thereby reduced the barriers

126. Seeid.
127. See generally Hannah Bergman & Vivek Shankar, In Brief: Feinstein Fights OCC
PreemptionRules, AM. BANKER, Sept. 29, 2004, at 20.
128. See generallyLockyer, 2004 WL 1490432 * 1 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2004).
129. See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
130. See EFT REP., supra note 125.
131. See generally Jaikumar Vijayan, Banks Balk at Info-Sharing Provision in Privacy
Law; Claim compliance with Calif. SB I will raise IT costs, COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 2,

2004, at 8.
132. See Fischer & Ireland, supra note 1, at 11.
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for sharing information on financial institutions. 133 However, with the
result in Lockyer, at least in California, this benefit no longer exists, or
at least may remain in only a severely impaired form, as some
companies that operate within California have gone as far as to shut
down all cross-marketing activities because they are unaware of the
nuances associated with complying with SB 1.134 In addition, the lack of
cross-marketing could potentially impact the profits of large financial
institutions operating in California, as revenues generated by selling
consumer information to unaffiliated third parties is no longer an option,
cross
and as financial institutions are more restricted in their ability to
31
sell to consumers, even from the financial institutions' affiliates.
In considering what financial institutions can and/or will do
when it comes to cross marketing, there is the added consideration, in
California, of cost of compliance with SB 1.136 The added cost will
result from the implementation of a dual system to internally govern
how consumer information is shared with affiliates and nonaffiliated
third parties. Additionally, as it is not known if alternatives or ways to
elude the requirements of SBI exist, this further compounds banks'
inability to cross-market because the scope and reach of SBl is still
undetermined. 37 If cross marketing resumes for financial institutions,
there will be the added cost to these financial institutions of
implementing new policies between their affiliates in order to ensure
compliance with SB 1.138 These costs will be expensive, because in
most large financial institutions, opt-in and opt-out provisions for
customers are often complex, time-consuming, and expensive for the
139
institutions to maintain.
The cross marketing dilemma created by the Lockyer case is a
problem which may not be limited to banks operating in California for
long, because the problem will exist wherever a bank does business in a

133. See id.

134. See Vijayan, supra note 131, at 8.
135.
136.
Interim
2004.
137.
138.
139.

See Fischer & Ireland, supra note 1, at 11.
Leonard Bernstein, SB-I: The California Financial Information Privacy Actand Permanent Compliance Considerations, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, Sept. 27,
Id.
See Vijayan, supra note 131, at 8.
See id.
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state that has passed a privacy statute such as SB 1.140 As contended by
the federal agencies, Lockyer opens the door to banks being subject to
different privacy regulations within each state.' 41 Therefore, not only
are banks that operate in California impacted by the cost of compliance
with SB 1, but these banks are also affected by the cost of compliance
associated with forty nine other potential state privacy statutes, if other
states decided to enact such legislation. One of Congress' intentions in
establishing a national charter for banks was to provide uniform
standards for banks. 142 The benefits of such a uniform standard include
a reduction in the cost of credit, an increase in economic activity, and
increased efficiency for these institutions. 143 All these benefits are
eliminated when a state-by-state approach to privacy regulation is
taken. 144
Even more problematic is what will happen when mergers or
acquisitions occur between banks. 145 The problems associated with
compliance will be magnified because the combining banks may have
different systems for dealing with certain consumer information. 146 The
issue here is that banks usually maintain separate systems for
mortgages, credit cards, and deposit accounts, 147 so, when a
combination occurs, the multiple systems, in the multiple states, with
various privacy regulations may require large costs to reconcile. 148 All
of this shows that a move toward individual state regulation of the
information sharing policies of nationally chartered banks impacts
1 49
banks in several negative ways.

140. See generally CAL. FIN. CODE § 4052.5 (2004); Lockyer, 2004 WL 1490432 *1
(E.D. Cal. June 30, 2004) (noting that the California Statute can be applied to financial
institutions within the state).
141. See generally Arthur D. Postal, After CaliforniaCourt Decision, Industry pushesfor
Uniform Standards, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH-FIN. SERV. EDITION, July 19,
2004.
142. See generally OCC Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and
Appraisals, 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 & 34 (2004).
143. See Agency Brief, supra note 48, at 12.
144. See id.
145. See Vijayan, supra note 131, at 8.
146. See generally id.
147. See id.
148. See generally id.
149. See supra notes 130-48 and accompanying text.
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LOCKYER CURRENTLY

Currently the Lockyer case is on appeal. 5 0 Six federal agencies,
including the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (FRB), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (six federal agencies) have filed a
joint brief on the issue of preemption of SB1, urging the Court of
51
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to overturn the trial court's decision.1
Most believe the support of these federal regulatory agencies will help
the financial groups in the appeal process, 15' because on appeal, the
amicus brief submitted by the six federal agencies, will be given strong
consideration in support of the argument for overturning the lower
court's decision. 153 The Bush administration has also gotten involved,
and has urged that the appellate court reverse the decision of the lower
court; 54 Senator Dianne Feinstein of California; however, has urged
that the trial court's decision be upheld by publicly supporting
5
California's right to act in this area.1
VI. CONCLUSION

When the buzz words and political agendas for supporting or
attacking such statutes are set aside and the real issues in Lockyer are
examined one conclusion is left-the case was incorrectly reasoned and
56
the impact on the financial industry could be huge.
The analysis by the district court in Lockyer appears to have
157
some potential flaws which may give rise to a reversal upon appeal.
150. News Release, Federal Trade Commission, Aug. 17, 2004, at 2004 WL 1835159
(noting that the case is on appeal in U.S. Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit).
151. See Agency Brief, supra note 48, at I (mentioning in the brief the statutes involved
and their interpretations of such).
152. Damian Paletta, Agencies' Backing Could Help Banks In Privacy Battle, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 13, 2004, at 3 (stating that agencies' opinions are usually given serious
consideration by courts).
153. BRUCE ET AL., supra note 67.
154. Don Thompson, Bush Backs Bank's Appeal of State's Financial Privacy Law, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 12, 2004.
155. See Bergman & Shankar, supra note 127, at 20
156. See supra notes 125-149 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 125-149 and accompanying text.
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The original presumption against preemption was wrong, the analysis of
the relevant statutes was wrong, and ultimately the decision was
wrong. 158 However it will be the impact of the decision on the financial
industry in general which highlights the flaws of the decision. Congress
determined that it no longer made sense to establish a national banking
industry which also allowed states to provide a patched framework of
privacy rules to which these banks were required to comply. 159 The
Lockyer decision, however, imposes just this structure on the banking
industry. The decision also places banks in different states on different
playing fields, 160 and in addition adds costs of compliance issues.' 6 ' In
summation, one can see the reason why the Lockyer case created such
uproar, and one can also see the reasons why the decision must
162
changed.
JASON SHROFF

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See
See
See
See
See

Postal, supra note 141.
id.
id.
supra notes 125-49 and accompanying text.
supra notes 81-103 and accompanying text.
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